Stock-based incentive contracts and managerial performance: the case of Ralston Purina Company
- 21 January 1999
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 51 (2) , 195-217
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(98)00050-6
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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