The effects of pay schemes and ratchets on budgetary slack and performance: A multiperiod experiment
- 31 December 1991
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Accounting, Organizations and Society
- Vol. 16 (1) , 47-60
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(91)90032-a
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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