Species, Higher Taxa, and the Units of Evolution
- 1 March 1991
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 58 (1) , 84-101
- https://doi.org/10.1086/289600
Abstract
A number of authors argue that while species are evolutionary units, individuals and real entities, higher taxa are not. I argue that drawing the divide between species and higher taxa along such lines has not been successful. Common conceptions of evolutionary units either include or exclude both types of taxa. Most species, like all higher taxa, are not individuals, but historical entities. Furthermore, higher taxa are neither more nor less real than species. None of this implies that there is no distinction between species and higher taxa; the point is that such a distinction is more subtle than many authors have claimed.Keywords
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