Taxes Versus Quotas for a Stock Pollutant
Preprint
- 1 January 1998
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We compare the effects of taxes and quotas for an environmental problem in which the regulator and polluter have asymmetric information about abatement costs, aKeywords
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