Control without deception: Individual behaviour in free-riding experiments revisited
- 1 December 2000
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 3 (3) , 215-240
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01669773
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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