Competencies, Cracks, and Conflicts

Abstract
Over the past 5 years, a new and unexpected form of interest representation has developed in the European Union: subnational governments that mobilize directly in Brussels. The authors propose explanations for this phenomenon, drawing on theories of public choice, resource mobilization, and multilevel governance. The first set of hypotheses is concerned with the material and cultural resources that may induce a subnational government to organize in the European arena. The second set of hypotheses explains regional representation as an outcome of overlapping competencies, tensions, and conflicts in a system of multilevel governance. Logistic analysis of the probability of regional representation provides support for the second set of hypotheses. The authors find that subnational representation is positively associated with the degree of overlap between the competencies of subnational and supranational governments and with the political distinctiveness of a region and the relative strength of citizens' regional identity.