Ownership and Control of German Corporations
Preprint
- 1 January 2000
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
In a study of the ownership of German corporations, we find a strong relation between board turnover and corporate performance, little association of concentratKeywords
All Related Versions
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