Organizational Behavior and Economic Growth: A Norwegian Perspective*
- 1 March 1986
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Scandinavian Political Studies
- Vol. 9 (1) , 51-63
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.1986.tb00335.x
Abstract
By using game‐theory, it is indicated that encompassing organizations may participate in dilemma games with free‐rider problems. Next, examinations of institutional details of Norwegian corporatism point out that creative or productive strategies may be quite likely even among small interest organizations. In the last section it is argued that the assumption of economic growth being a collective good is more acceptable the larger the public sector. Again, institutional details need to be in focus. The model closing the paper dwells on whether comprehensive organizations really have stronger incentives to choose creativity rather than to fight for redistributions. A general affirmative answer cannot be provided.Keywords
This publication has 2 references indexed in Scilit:
- Public Goods, Property Rights, and Political OrganizationsInternational Studies Quarterly, 1979
- The Pure Theory of Public ExpenditureThe Review of Economics and Statistics, 1954