Darwinism, Process Structuralism, and Natural Kinds
- 1 January 1996
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 63 (S3) , S1-S9
- https://doi.org/10.1086/289930
Abstract
Darwinists classify biological traits either by their ancestry (homology) or by their adaptive role. Only the latter can provide traditional natural kinds, but only the former is practicable. Process structuralists exploit this embarrassment to argue for non-Darwinian classifications in terms of underlying developmental mechanisms. This new taxonomy will also explain phylogenetic inertia and developmental constraint. I argue that Darwinian homologies are natural kinds despite having historical essences and being spatio-temporally restricted. Furthermore, process structuralist explanations of biological form require an unwarranted assumption about the space of developmental possibility.Keywords
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