The Impact of Equity-preferences on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements
- 1 June 2006
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 34 (2) , 247-267
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-005-0006-4
Abstract
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