CENTRAL BANKS‘ INDEPENDENCE: INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS, RANKINGS and CENTRAL BANKERS’ VIEWS
- 1 November 1994
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Scottish Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 41 (4) , 434-443
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9485.1994.tb01137.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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