On the uniqueness of the solution to a large linear assignment problem
- 31 December 1992
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 21 (6) , 509-521
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(92)90024-2
Abstract
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This publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
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