THE EFFECT OF THE NUMBER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ON CENTRAL CITY EXPENDITURES

1 March 1982

journal article
research article
Published by University of Chicago Press in National Tax Journal

Vol. 35 (1) , 79-87
https://doi.org/10.1086/ntj41862421

Abstract

This paper explores the notion that local governments engage in strategic behavior in an effort to retain tax base. In particular, the hypothesis that the level of expenditures for the central cities is inversely related to the degree of competition within the region is tested. Our empirical analysis shows that the level of expenditures is inversely related to the number of jurisdictions.

Keywords

BEHAVIOR
STRATEGIC
TAX
ENGAGE
RETAIN
JURISDICTIONS
NOTION
COMPETITION
CENTRAL CITIES
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

This publication has 2 references indexed in Scilit:

Some Determinants of Government Expenditures Within Metropolitan Areas
The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 1971
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures
Journal of Political Economy, 1956