Independence, Invariance and the Causal Markov Condition
- 1 December 1999
- journal article
- research article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 50 (4) , 521-583
- https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/50.4.521
Abstract
This essay explains what the Causal Markov Condition says and defends the condition from the many criticisms that have been launched against it. Although we are skeptical about some of the applications of the Causal Markov Condition, we argue that it is implicit in the view that causes can be used to manipulate their effects and that it cannot be surrendered without surrendering this view of causation.This publication has 28 references indexed in Scilit:
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