INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIBLE AUDITORS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT*
- 1 June 2006
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 54 (2) , 269-291
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2006.00283.x
Abstract
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