Breaking the Myth of Harmony: Theoretical and Methodological Guidelines to the Study of Rural Third World Households
- 1 September 1991
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Review of Radical Political Economics
- Vol. 23 (3-4) , 37-56
- https://doi.org/10.1177/048661349102300304
Abstract
Conventional neoclassical models of the household fail to account for the conflict and negotiation inherent in these fundamental economic units. The recent incorporation of game-theoretic notions of "bargained" decision-making into these models neglects gender as a defining feature of household economics. This paper develops an alternative feminist model of the household in which gender-based differentials in the access to key economic and noneconomic resources condition the formation of household economic goals, the allocation of labor and income to competing uses, and the welfare outcomes of household economic activities for all household members.Keywords
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