Low-probability-high-penalty enforcement strategies and the efficient operation of the plea-bargaining system
- 31 March 1992
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Law and Economics
- Vol. 12 (1) , 69-77
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(92)90006-d
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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