Bargaining and brinkmanship: Capital structure choice by regulated firms
- 31 December 1993
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 11 (4) , 475-497
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(93)90021-4
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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