VI.Akrasiaand conflict
- 1 June 1980
- journal article
- other
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 23 (2) , 193-212
- https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748008601902
Abstract
As Elster suggests in his chapter ‘Contradictions of the Mind’, in Logic and Society, akrasia and self‐deception represent the most common psychological functions for a person in conflict and contradiction. This article develops the theme of akrasia and conflict. Section I says what akrasia is not. Section II describes the character of the akrates, analyzing the sorts of conflicts to which he is subject and describing the sources of his debilities. A brief account is then given of the attractions of the akratic alternative: its power to focus or dominate the agent's attention; its being strongly habitual; its having the pull of social streaming: following the charismatic leader, the mechanisms of sympathetic or antipathetic infection, the models of role casting. Following these strategies is by no means pathological: these are relatively automatic (though still voluntary) psychological functions. That is precisely their power and attraction: they provide the conflicted akrates with an action solution, though not one that accords with his preferred judgment.Keywords
This publication has 2 references indexed in Scilit:
- War and Moral ResponsibilityPublished by Walter de Gruyter GmbH ,1974
- Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a PersonThe Journal of Philosophy, 1971