An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes
- 1 February 1995
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Vol. 9 (1) , 3-26
- https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.9.1.3
Abstract
Many researchers, following Kenneth Arrow's lead, have concerned themselves with stating various desirable or undesirable criteria and attempting to classify vote-counting systems. This paper moves away from theoretical discussions: the authors illustrate and motivate a variety of alternatives to plurality rule. The authors demonstrate by example how these alternatives, such as min-max majority and single transferable vote, work and where they fail. In choosing between flawed alternatives, which methods are best suited for selecting a single winner versus ranking the candidates? Does one approach favor candidates with loyal minorities or candidates with broad appeal? How do the authors achieve a representative outcome?Keywords
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