Cooperative Models and Corporate Crime: Panacea or Cop-Out?
- 1 July 1990
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Crime & Delinquency
- Vol. 36 (3) , 373-390
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0011128790036003005
Abstract
This article critiques the new “cooperative” models of regulatory reform, arguing that they will weaken the process of regulation. After documenting some of the problems of criminalization models, the article describes the major cooperative schemes that have been offered. The roots of their current popularity are examined and traced to the fiscal and ideological crises that beset capitalist economies in the 1980s. The consequences of adopting a cooperative model are set out. Last, the unlikely prospects for achieving more effective enforcement by cooperative regulation are discussed.Keywords
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