Remediation and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement
- 1 June 1999
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 72 (3) , 379-393
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(98)00101-7
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
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