Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems
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- 1 August 2001
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 116 (3) , 933-967
- https://doi.org/10.1162/00335530152466278
Abstract
This paper presents a theory of parliamentary systems with a proportional representation electoral system, a formateur selected based on party represKeywords
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