Auction Design for Voluntary Conservation Programs
- 1 December 2004
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 86 (5) , 1211-1217
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0002-9092.2004.00666.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (R829609)
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
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