ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: WHOSE SELF‐INTERESTS ARE BEING PROTECTED?
- 1 October 1985
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 23 (4) , 551-584
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1985.tb01783.x
Abstract
Special interest can explain why environmental policy limits economic activity in areas where air quality is above minumum standards. Locational competition among region helped create a policy that raised factor mobility cost from slower to faster growing regions. Analysis of votes shows greater support for this policy was received from northern urban constituencies and the greatest opposition came from the South and the West. Pollution abatement costs per unit of output are higher in areas with higher not lower air quality.Keywords
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This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
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- The Effect of Environmental Regulation on Optimal Plant Size and Factor SharesThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1984
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