Understanding how market power can arise in network competition: a game theoretic approach
- 1 September 1999
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Utilities Policy
- Vol. 8 (3) , 139-158
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0957-1787(99)00016-8
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 23 references indexed in Scilit:
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