Exact Complexity of the Winner Problem for Young Elections

Preprint

20 December 2001

preprint
Published by arXiv in arXiv

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.cs/0112021

Abstract

In 1977, Young proposed a voting scheme that extends the Condorcet Principle based on the fewest possible number of voters whose removal yields a Condorcet winner. We prove that both the winner and the ranking problem for Young elections is complete for the class of problems solvable in polynomial time by parallel access to NP. Analogous results for Lewis Carroll's 1876 voting scheme were recently established by Hemaspaandra et al. In contrast, we prove that the winner and ranking problems in Fishburn's homogeneous variant of Carroll's voting scheme can be solved efficiently by linear programming.

Keywords

LINEAR PROGRAMMING
PROBLEM FOR YOUNG
EXACT COMPLEXITY
YOUNG ELECTIONS
RANKING PROBLEM
WINNER PROBLEM
VOTING SCHEME
CONDORCET
CARROLL'S

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Version 1, 2001-12-20, ArXiv

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