Reputation and imperfect information
- 1 August 1982
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 27 (2) , 253-279
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8
Abstract
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All Related Versions
This publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:
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