Opinion-Producing Agents: Career Concerns and Exaggeration
Preprint
- 1 January 2001
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper models the incentives created by career concerns for opinion-producing agents. We find that career concerns can create an incentive for exaggerationKeywords
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