Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
- 1 July 2003
- journal article
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 71 (4) , 1083-1119
- https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00440
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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