The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
- 1 February 2000
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 115 (1) , 201-235
- https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300554719
Abstract
We create an environment in which congestion forces agents to match inefficiently early. We then introduce one of two centralized clearinghouse mechaKeywords
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