Optimal penal codes in nearly symmetric Bertrand supergames with capacity constraints
- 31 December 1995
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 24 (1) , 1-22
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)00675-z
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
- Some Results on Optimal Penal Codes in Asymmetric Bertrand SupergamesJournal of Economic Theory, 1994
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with DiscountingEconometrica, 1988
- Optimal Penal Codes in Price-setting Supergames with Capacity ConstraintsThe Review of Economic Studies, 1987
- Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergamesJournal of Economic Theory, 1986
- Price Duopoly and Capacity ConstraintsInternational Economic Review, 1972