Breaking the stalemate in Western Sahara

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Abstract
The stalemate in Western Sahara was a casualty of a chronic disability of conventional UN peacekeeping, now particularly symptomatic of more complex transitional operations. A link has been missing between the consent of warring parties to negotiated settlements and their behaviour on the ground, and between the political decisions of the Security Council and operational instructions in the field. The UN has not developed coherent and comprehensive diplomatic, military and political strategies that are both legitimate and effective. Nor has it managed to generate genuine political will throughout the course of a peace process. To do so requires something of a joint monitoring cell attached to operations and composed of the parties, the UN and regional organizations, and a contact group of UN member states that can provide confidence and leverage. Bridging the missing link in the Western Sahara at this late stage will be a vital experiment for the next phase of UN operations generally.

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