The Subjective and Objective Evaluation of Incentive Stock Options
Preprint
- 1 January 2002
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Incentive options are held by managers and employees who invariably hold undiversified portfolios with substantial amounts invested in their own company's cKeywords
All Related Versions
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