A STATISTICAL THEORY OF EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES
- 1 June 1996
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in The Japanese Economic Review
- Vol. 47 (2) , 186-209
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00043.x
Abstract
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This publication has 19 references indexed in Scilit:
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