Bargaining and concession making under bilateral monopoly.

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Abstract
SS WERE 148 MALE UNDERGRADUATES. IN 1 CONDITION AGREEMENT IN A 2-PERSON BARGAINING GAME WAS REQUIRED TO WIN MONEY, WHILE IN ANOTHER AGREEMENT WAS NOT REQUIRED. ALL SS WERE LED TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WERE BARGAINING WITH A PERSON IN ANOTHER ROOM BUT THEY WERE ACTUALLY BARGAINING WITH E. THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE WAS THE VARYING RATE OF CONCESSION MAKING MANIPULATED BY E, AND THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE WAS THE MEAN OFFER OF SS ON THE LAST TRIAL. RESULTS SUPPORT THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS: (1) CONCESSION BY SS AND ES ARE INVERSELY RELATED; (2) A FIRM BARGAINING STRATEGY MAY INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF REACHING AN ADVANTAGEOUS AGREEMENT, BUT MAY REDUCE THE PROBABILITY OF REACHING AN ADVANTAGEOUS AGREEMENT, BUT MAY REDUCE THE PROBABILITY OF REACHING A FAIR AGREEMENT; AND (3) A STRATEGY OF MAKING A FAIR OFFER INITIALLY AND REMAINING FIRM THEREAFTER IS LIKELY TO EVOKE THE LEAST AMOUNT OF YIELDING. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)

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