Government Coalitions and Intraparty Politics
- 1 October 1990
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 20 (4) , 489-507
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400005950
Abstract
A new model of government formation is elaborated and developed to allow consideration of politics within political parties. The impact of coalition bargaining on intraparty politics is considered, as well as the impact of intraparty politics on coalition bargaining. Different intraparty decision-making regimes are shown to affect coalition outcomes. Finally, the potential impact of anticipated coalition bargaining on the choice of decision-making regime within a party is explored.Keywords
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