Crises and Prices: Information Aggregation, Multiplicity and Volatility

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  • 1 January 2005
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      • Published in RePEc
Abstract
Crises are volatile times when endogenous sources of information are closely monitored. We study the role of information in crises by introducing a financial market in a coordination game with imperfect information. The asset price aggregates dispersed private information acting as a public noisy signal. In contrast to the case with exogenous information, our main result is that uniqueness may not obtain as a perturbation from perfect information: multiplicity is ensured with small noise. In addition, we show that: (a) multiplicity may emerge in the financial price itself; (b) less noise may contribute toward nonfundamental volatility even when the equilibrium is unique; and (c) similar results obtain for a model where individuals observe one another?s actions, highlighting the importance of endogenous information more generally. (JEL D53, D82, D83) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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