Why Potentiality Matters
- 1 December 1987
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 17 (4) , 815-829
- https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1987.10715920
Abstract
Do fetuses have a right to life in virtue of the fact that they are potential adult human beings? I take the claim that the fetus is a potential adult human being to come to this: if the fetus grows normally there will be an adult human animal that was once the fetus. Does this fact ground a claim to our care and protection? A great deal hangs on the answer to this question. The actual mental and physical capacities of a human fetus are inferior to those of adult creatures generally thought to lack a serious right to life (e.g., adult chickens), and the mere fact that a fetus belongs to our species in particular seems morally irrelevant. Consequently, a strong fetal claim to protection rises or falls with the appeal to the fetus's potentiality, for nothing else can justify it.Keywords
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- Abortion and Moral TheoryPublished by Walter de Gruyter GmbH ,1981
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