Optimal Contracting of Separable Production Technologies
- 1 October 1997
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 21 (1) , 15-39
- https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0561
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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