In-kind transfers, self-selection and optimal tax policy
- 1 January 1997
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 41 (1) , 97-114
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(95)00131-x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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