Federalism and nuclear waste disposal: The struggle over shared decision making

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Abstract
Traditionally the domain of federal agencies, authority to select sites for the disposal of commercial high‐level nuclear wastes has recently been expanded to include a role for host states. State opposition to earlier siting efforts had demonstrated the dificulties federal agencies faced in resolving conflict between the local population bearing the costs and the dispersed population receiving the benefits. The new model defines the agency and the state as adversarial representatives of these competing interests. An outstanding weakness, however, is that it does not clearly specify who should speak for the state, and may actually promote intrastate conflict. The adversarial approach does not provide a generic solution to the problem of federalism, but it may prove useful at the state level for selecting disposal sites for low‐level radioactive wastes and hazardous chemical wastes.

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