A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution
- 1 August 1995
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 2 (2) , 279-293
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00877502
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Acid Rain Game as a Resource Allocation Process with an Application to the International Cooperation among Finland, Russia and EstoniaThe Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1995
- Dynamic Procedures and Incentives in Public Good EconomiesEconometrica, 1993
- Strategies for the international protection of the environmentJournal of Public Economics, 1993
- Emission Taxes in a Dynamic International Game of CO2 EmissionsPublished by Springer Nature ,1992
- International Environmental Agreements as GamesPublished by Springer Nature ,1992
- Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. ConceptsJournal of Economic Theory, 1987
- On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution ControlThe Review of Economic Studies, 1980
- To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution ControlThe Review of Economic Studies, 1977
- A Tatonement Process for Public GoodsThe Review of Economic Studies, 1971
- Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public GoodsEconometrica, 1970