The Rules of Organizing and the Managerial Role
- 1 July 1989
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Organization Studies
- Vol. 10 (3) , 301-325
- https://doi.org/10.1177/017084068901000302
Abstract
This paper is an attempt to clarify the meaning of the term 'an organization' based on the Weberian distinction between corporate groups and organizations and to identify the managerial role imbedded in his definition. This is done in two stages. First, Weber's definition is theoretically analyzed and its logical implications are presented. In the second stage, the hypotheses generated from these implications are empirically tested. By utilizing data collected from 64 U.S. national manufacturing trade associations, Weber's analytical distinctions between corporate groups and organizations are examined. The patterns of findings are congruent with Weber's argument that organizations are a distinct subset of corporate groups. In addition, findings suggest that the existence of a staff distinct from the members of the group is critical for understanding the nature of organizations.This publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
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