Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
- 1 October 1990
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 52 (1) , 45-67
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90066-s
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 18 references indexed in Scilit:
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