Minimum Resource and Pivotal Power Theories
- 1 March 1975
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 19 (1) , 89-107
- https://doi.org/10.1177/002200277501900105
Abstract
This paper reports a competitive test of minimum resource and pivotal power theories in tetradic situations. Using resource distributions for which the theories make distinct predictions, the study obtained data on the formation of coalitions and the division of payoffs. Results indicate that minimum resource theory is superior to pivotal power theory in predicting coalition formation, especially for resource distributions where one member has veto capabilities. The theories perform equally well in predicting payoff division, with each able to explain a large proportion of the variation. Both theories are more accurate in predicting payoff division for nonveto situations than for veto situationsKeywords
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