The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts

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Abstract
In Aristotle there is no general term for those faculties of the soul which he treats of in the Third Book of De Anima and in De Memoria et Reminiscentia to differentiate them as a class from the five senses which he treats of in the Second Book of De Anima. In Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew philosophic texts, however, these post-sensationary faculties, or some of them, or sometimes only one of them, are designated by the term “internal senses,” in contradistinction to the five senses which are designated by the term “external senses.” Sometimes instead of “external” the terms “corporeal” and “passive” are used, and instead of “internal” the terms “spiritual,” “separable,” and “cerebral.” Sometimes, too, the term “faculties” or “apprehensions” is used instead of “senses.” The use of the terms “internal,” “spiritual,” and “cerebral” has been explained by the fact that the faculties to which they are applied reside within the brain and operate without bodily organs.

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