Regulation as an adverse selection problem
- 1 March 1988
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 32 (2) , 473-481
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(88)90193-6
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
- Using Cost Observation to Regulate FirmsJournal of Political Economy, 1986
- Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet EffectThe Review of Economic Studies, 1985
- A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firmJournal of Public Economics, 1984
- Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and AuditingThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1984
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown CostsEconometrica, 1982