High-Water Marks and Hedge Fund Management Contracts
Preprint
- 1 January 1998
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Incentive or performance fees for money managers are frequently accompanied by high-water mark provisions which condition the payment of the performance fee upoKeywords
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