Informality and rent-seeking bureaucracies in a model of long-run growth
- 1 August 2000
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 46 (1) , 173-197
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-3932(00)00020-9
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